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ABSTRACT
Data visualizations are standard tools for assessing and com-
municating risks. However, it is not always clear which de-
signs are optimal or how encoding choices might influence
risk perception and decision-making. In this paper, we report
the findings of a large-scale gambling game that immersed par-
ticipants in an environment where their actions impacted their
bonuses. Participants chose to either enter a draw or receive
guaranteed monetary gains based on five common visualiza-
tion designs. By measuring risk perception and observing
decision-making, we showed that icon arrays tended to elicit
economically sound behavior. We also found that people were
more likely to gamble when presented area proportioned tri-
angle and circle designs. Using our results, we model risk
perception and decisions for each visualization and provide a
ranking to improve visualization selection.
Author Keywords
Visualization; Decision-Making; Proportion Estimates; Risk
Behavior; Decision Theory
CCS Concepts
•Human-centered computing → Visualization application
domains; Visual analytics; Information visualization;
INTRODUCTION
There are several competing views on what it means to make a
decision. Psychologists believe that we make choices based on
empirical evidence and beliefs about the likelihood of specific
events [43]. Economic theorists view decision-making as a
selection between alternatives based on a weighted sum of
probabilities [34]. Such choices include deciding whether to
bike or drive based on the chance of rain, whether to opt for
preventive health care based on the likelihood of developing a
disease or whether to enter a gamble based on the chance of
winning a prize.
In many cases, it is increasingly common to use data visu-
alization to support reasoning about risks and to aid sound
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decision-making. However, it is reasonable to assume that
encoding choices can influence the decisions people make. Re-
searchers have shown that visualizations can impact speed [8,
37], accuracy [37], memorability [3, 5], statistical reason-
ing [27, 30], and judgement [8, 11, 47]. These effects can
have significant repercussions, especially when decisions are
life-altering. Still, a designer can represent the same data
using different, yet equally theoretically valid visualization
designs [26], and it is sometimes difficult for designers to iden-
tify a poor fit for the data [31]. Therefore, what we need is a
thorough understanding of which designs lead to (in)accurate
judgment and how probability distortions influence behavior.
At the heart of decision-making with visualization is graphical
perception. People must first decode the information presented
in graphical form in order to reason and make a choice. Early
work has investigated the relationship between design and
graphical perception [8, 10] when making proportion judg-
ment. We know, for example, that people are best at decoding
quantitative information when the data is encoded in the po-
sition of a visual mark and worst when the encoding uses
area. Subsequent studies that looked explicitly at part-of-the-
whole judgment tasks found no difference between angle (pie
charts) and position (bar graphs) [25, 37, 39]. In this paper,
we reexamine basic encoding options to investigate how data
visualization design might influence decision-making.
The work in this paper builds on the previous work in two
ways. First, we investigate proportion judgment for five com-
mon chart designs across a range of seven probability values.
By varying both the chart types and the probability values,
we are able to provide guidance for how practitioners might
choose a visual representation based on their data. Second,
we utilize a gambling game that immersed participants in an
environment where their actions impacted their bonuses. The
lottery scenarios allow us to observe decisions with real-world
consequences. Consider the following hypothetical gamble:
Which do you prefer?
A: 50% chance to win $1000, 50% chance to win nothing
or
B: $450 for sure [20]
Decision theorists have long studied simple gambles such as
this because gambles provide a straightforward framework
that shares key characteristics with complex real-world situa-
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Figure 1. The visualization conditions used in the study. We randomly
assigned each participants to one of the five visualization conditions or
a text-only condition. Participants drew 25 hypothetical lotteries with
each of the seven risk values {.05, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, .95}. Although we had
no control over the display size, the default size of the visualizations were
200×200 pixels, and the colors were colorblind safe.
tions [7]. For instance, complex decisions are often a choice
between one or more prospects, and the consequences of the
decisions are almost always uncertain. The lottery scenario is
a useful test-bed because one need only to weigh the risk of
entering the lottery against the possible return associated with
the guaranteed payment.
We report the findings of two crowd-sourced experiment us-
ing a gambling scenario with real monetary gains. Our study
participants chose to either enter a draw or receive guaranteed
monetary gains based on the probabilities shown by the visu-
alization designs. From Experiment 1, we analyzed the data
from 406 participants'which resulted in 10,150 observations.
Each participant saw 25 lottery scenarios and we evaluated the
perceived risk of 5 different types of widely used visualizations
(see Figure 1). Experiment 2 focused on decision-making. We
analyzed 300 participants'decisions which resulted in 7500
observations. Using the same gambling platform, participants
made 25 lottery choices to win a prize of up to $10. We then
evaluated the quality of the choices for each of the five visual-
ization conditions (plus a control group with no visualization).
By modeling risk perception and behavior for each visual-
ization, we provide a guideline for designers to select the
right chart to communicate information. We make the follow-
ing contributions to the understanding of risk perception and
decision-making with visualization:
• We demonstrate that visualization design impacts the graphi-
cal perception and causes probability distortion, and provide
a clear ranking of the tested designs based on their percep-
tual errors
icons > pie > bar > triangle > circle
• We show that, for every tested design, people consistently
overestimated the size of small proportions and underesti-
mate the size of larger portions.
• We show that charts influence risk behaviors. For low proba-
bilities, we observed that visualization groups (e.g. triangle
with 5% and pie with 10%) exhibited greater risk-seeking
tendencies.
• We provide generalizable models for each visualization that
can predict perception and decision-making for the first
time
BACKGROUND
Graphical Perception
The act of decoding a data visualization is called graphical
perception [8]. There are a number of studies that investi-
gated how visualization can lead to distortion in judgment.
For instance, Cleveland and McGill provided a taxonomy of
judgment that people make when decoding quantitative infor-
mation from charts: position along a common scale, position
along common scales, position along identical but non-aligned
scales, length, angle, slope and area [8, 9, 10]. They con-
ducted a series of perceptual experiments where participants
performed comparison judgment by estimating the percentage
of a small division out of a larger one (see Figure 2). They
found that people were best at decoding quantitative informa-
tion when the data was encoded using the position of a visual
mark and worst when using area.
Simkin and Hastie tested subjects’ ability to make proportion
(part-of-the-whole) judgment with different types of charts
[37]. Participants estimated the percentage represented by
the indicated portion of the chart. The results showed no
measurable difference between the angle (pie) and position
(bar) estimates, but angle and position were superior to length.
Spence and Lewandowsky’s study confirmed that there was
no significance difference between angle and position visual-
izations [41].
Other researchers have also explored tasks such as judging
correlations [15, 35, 46] and perception in tabletop and multi-
surface environments [45]. Graphical perception has been
extensively tested for various designs such as bar graph [47, 38,
32], pie chart [24, 39, 40, 32], bubble chart [16], treemap [16],
scatterplot [25, 42] and various representations of time series
data [19].
There are two primary findings to highlight from this diverse
body of work: (1) visual encoding impacts graphical percep-
tion and (2) the nature of the task influences this interaction.
Building on the prior research, we aim to investigate how
visual encoding impacts risk perception, risk attitudes, and
decision-making.
Figure 2. Charts used in prior works. Participants were asked to com-
pare what proportion of the first probability is equal to the second. [8,
37]
Visualizing Risks for Decision-Making
The existing research on visualizing risk and supporting
decision-making is broad and spans many domains. Much
of the prior work in the visualization community on support-
ing risk communication has focused on embedding data about
uncertainty within the visualization itself [11, 18, 21, 22, 33].
Hullman et al. provides a comprehensive review of the exist-
ing work in this area [17]. There has also been a substantial
body of work that investigates how visualization supports risk
communication and medical decision-making (e.g., [27] and
[30]). Typical evaluation methods utilize some measure of
speed and accuracy. Very few have investigated the impact of
visual design on decision-making.
Recent work by Kale et al. examined how people make deci-
sions based on uncertainty visualizations [21]. In one study,
participants played the role of a newspaper editor and saw
either a bar chart with error bars displaying job statistics for a
given year, or a hypothetical outcome plot [18] which uses an-
imation to show the same data. Participants needed to decide
between two headlines: "Latest Job Data Show No Growth"
or "Latest Job Data Show Growth Trend". Their findings
show that animation can effectively support decision-making
under the tested circumstances.
In the medical domain, Galesic et al. conducted an experiment
where patients were shown the risk of a disease in a numerical
or a visual format. They were asked to rate the perceived
seriousness of the disease and the importance of screening on
a scale of 1 to 15 [13]. The results showed that participants
who were shown the information in a numerical format rated
the disease as more serious compared to the group who were
shown icon arrays. Similarly, helpfulness of screening had a
higher score for the numerical format. Galesic et al. states
that visual aids help patients to make more informed medical
decisions [13]. Ruiz et al. asked at risk patients to decide
whether they would opt for screening based on visual risk in-
formation about the disease [36]. They confirmed the finding
that people were more risk-averse when presented icon arrays.
Other work by Nadav-Greenberg et al. investigated whether
participants would issue a weather forecast when presented
visual weather diagrams [28].
We situate our approach to investigate how visualization in-
fluences decision-making in Decision Theory. We created a
real-life gambling scenario and observe participants’ lottery
decisions to provide a ranking that can improve visualization
selection to assist decision-making in a number of areas.
Decision Theory
Economists and psychologists have long studied how people
make choices under risk by investigating prospects or gam-
bling scenarios. A prospect is a contract:
(x1, p1 : ... : xn, pn), (1)
that yields xi with probability pi, where ∑ni=1 pi = 1 [20].
Prospects provide a simple model for understanding risky
decisions.
The classical method for evaluating a gamble is through as-
sessing its expected value. The expected value of a prospect is
the sum of the outcomes where the probabilities weight each
value:
ev =
n
∑
i=1
pixi (2)
For example, consider the gambling scenario in Section 1, the
expected value of option A is 500 (.5× 1000+ .5× 0) and
the expected value of option B is 450 (1× 450). A rational
decision-maker would then choose option A over option B.
However, most people would choose the sure payment of $450.
This highlights the perhaps obvious conjecture that humans
are not always rational.
One of the dominant theories of decision making, Expected
Utility Theory (EUT), has served for many years as both a
model that describes economic behaviors [12] and a model of
rational choice [23]. In particular, it states that people make
choices based on their utility - the psychological values of the
outcomes. For instance, if a person prefers an apple over a
banana, then it stands to reason that they would prefer a 5%
chance of winning an apple over a 5% chance of winning a
banana. Using EUT, we can assess the overall utility of a
gamble by summing the utilities of the outcomes weighted by
their probabilities.
U =
n
∑
i=1
piu(xi)
This model, however, still assumes that most humans are ra-
tional and consistent, and solely decide on prospects based on
their utility [20]. Still, EUT provides a tool for us to evalu-
ated peoples’ behavior when choosing among risky options
and is the foundation for the other dominant economic theory,
Prospect Theory [20].
A refinement of EUT that is used to describe risk percep-
tion and decision-making with risk empirically is known as
Prospect Theory [20]. The theory essentially posits that people
tend to underweight common or high-frequency events while
over-weighting rare or low-frequency events. Typically, there
is a probability weighting function pi such that
pi(p)> p, when p is small, and
pi(p)< p, when p is large but not a certainty
pi reflects the subjective desirability of a choice, which in
practice replaces the stated probabilities with weighting fac-
tors pi(p). For example, researchers found that 72 out of 100
experiment participants favored the option of getting $5000
with a probability of 0.001, a small probability event, over the
prospect of getting $5 for certain [20]. Both options have the
same expected value, yet the majority of participants overesti-
mated the probability associated with getting 5000. Further-
more, the prospect theory stipulates that such phenomenon has
a two-fold impact on binary decision-making: (1) people tend
to favor the option of getting a large gain with a small proba-
bility over getting a small gain with certainty, and (2) people
tend to prefer a small loss with certainty over a large loss with
tiny probability. Researchers see the former phenomenon as
Figure 3. An example of the lottery decision sheet used in Experiment
1. Participants were asked to give their best guess for the proportion
displayed by the chart. They only needed to select one value - the other
one was automatically populated for them. Experiment II does not con-
tain the probability estimation part but instead focuses on the lottery
decisions
a risk-seeking behavior in the gain domain and the latter as
a risk-aversion behavior in the loss domain. Lotteries can be
expressed in terms of gains and losses (though it is uncom-
mon) and therefore have related gain and loss domains. For
our purpose, we limit our scope to the gain domain.
Relevant to the current work, Bruhin et al. [7] conducted a
series of large scale lottery studies and classified the distribu-
tions of behavioral types of different portions of the popula-
tion based on how closely their behaviors are to that described
by EUT and Prospect Theory. They analyzed the Relative
Risk Premia, a descriptive metric of how risk-seeking or risk-
averse a choice is [7]. They showed that participants were
risk-seeking for low-probability gains and risk-averse for high-
probability gains.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This manuscript extends the prior research by investigating
the complex relationship between visualization design, risk
perception, and decision-making. Despite the sizable body
of work in graphical perception and risk visualization, we
know very little about how encoding choices might influence
real-world decisions. Prior work in psychology and economic
theory provides a convenient foundation to investigate this
relationship. In particular, we leverage a classical task for
eliciting decision-making under risk, by observing actions as
participants chose between entering a gamble and or receiving
a guaranteed bonus payoff. We used five common designs
to display seven lottery probability values that ranged from
a 5% to a 95% chance of winning. We framed the following
research questions to guide our investigation:
1. How do visualization design and probability values impact
risk perception and probability distortion?
2. Does visual encoding impact risk attitudes and the choices
people make?
In the succeeding sections, we present the results of two large
scale web-based experiments. Our first study investigates how
visualization design influences probability distortion. Our sec-
ond experiment evaluates how people make decisions from
visualization. Together, these experiments address the ques-
tion of how users decode and make choices based on various
visualization designs.
EXPERIMENT 1 : PROPORTION DISTORTION
Decision-making with visualization first involves decoding the
information that is displayed. Thus, we begin our investiga-
tions by inspecting the effect of visualization on probability
perception. Although Experiment I focuses on perceptual er-
rors, we used the gambling scenario to maintain situational
consistency across the two studies. We randomly assigned
each participant to one of five visualization groups (pie, icon,
triangle, bar and circle) and within each group, they observed
seven probabilities. Participants completed twenty-five lottery
sheets as demonstrated by Figure 3. They first estimated the
lottery probabilities by entering their best guess of the val-
ues depicted by the visualization. Then they chose between
entering the lottery or receiving a sure bonus payout.
Participants
We recruited 406 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
There were 234 men and and self-reported ages ranged from
18 to 65 years (µ = 34.7;σ = 9.49). 73% of our participants
self-reported to have completed at least a college education.
Each participant had a HIT approval rate of 98% with at least
100 approved HITs. We did not limit geographical location,
but we required all subjects to be English-speaking between 18
and 65 years. We paid a base rate of $1.00, plus a bonus of up
to $10.70 depending on the lottery outcomes. Bonus payments
range from $4.35 to $9.30 (µ = 7.18;σ = .94). Each partic-
ipant worked at their own speed and the average completion
time was approximately 29 minutes.
Table 1. The prospects that were used in the study. p1 denotes the prob-
abilities (p2 = 1− p1) and x1 and x2 are the outcomes. We used a point
system for the outcomes where 1 point equaled $0.01. Participants saw
all combinations in a random order.
p1 x1 x2 p1 x1 x2 p1 x1 x2
.05 20 0 .25 50 20 .75 50 20
.05 40 10 .50 10 0 .90 10 0
.05 50 20 .50 20 10 .90 20 10
.05 150 50 .50 40 10 .90 50 0
.10 10 0 .50 50 0 .95 20 0
.10 20 10 .50 50 20 .95 40 10
.10 50 0 .50 150 0 .95 50 20
.25 20 10 .75 20 0
.25 40 10 .75 40 10
Figure 4. The initial designs that we considered for the study. After accounting for the nature of the charts (area, length, natural frequency), we selected
designs 2,3,4,7 and 8.
Lottery Game
Consistent with prior work from the economic decision-
making domain [7], we presented participants with 25 two-
outcome lotteries (n = 2) that were choices between risky
and certain gains. We used a points system for our payoff
quantities where 1 point equaled $0.01. The probabilities,
pi, were drawn from the set P = {.05, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, .95}
and the outcomes x1 and x2 ranged from 0 to 150 points ($0
to $1.50). Table 1, summarizes the probability and outcome
combinations used in the study.
Each lottery sheet comprised of the prospect to consider and a
list of 20 equally-spaced outcomes that ranged from x1 to x2.
Figure 3 shows an example of the lottery sheets. Participants
first estimated the lottery probability values, then used the
decision sheet to select their lottery preferences. For each row,
they indicated whether they preferred to enter the lottery or
receive a guaranteed payment. For the control condition (no
visualization), participant saw the lottery prospects in text and
simply selected their preferences.
At the end of the experiment, we randomly selected one row
from each of the 25 decision sheets, and the participant’s
choice in that row determined the bonus. For example, let us
assume that we randomly drew the row highlighted in green
in figure 3. Suppose that the participant indicated a preference
for the guaranteed payment; her bonus for that sheet would
be 400 points ($4.00). Now, suppose instead, the participant
opted to enter the lottery, we would simulate the lottery to
determine her payment. The bonus was the sum of winnings
for each sheet.
Visualization Designs
Displaying proportions is an everyday use of data visualiza-
tion. For instance, visualizations are prominent in the medical
community for communicating risks of diseases and screening
test results. Similar proportion charts are used daily in press,
business, and market surveys.
There are many potential designs for representing probabili-
ties. For inspiration, we reviewed common visualizations in
the medical community for displaying risks. Figure 4 shows
the initial designs that were considered in for the study. We
selected nine possible encodings of proportions and conducted
a series of pilot studies to narrow the selections to unique de-
signs. We rejected designs based on judgment similarity (e.g.,
the grid and icon array elicited similar counting judgment)
or due to inconsistency with the design space. Informed by
our pilot studies, we chose the five visualizations in figure 1:
icons, pie, circle, triangle, and bar.
We selected these visualization designs because they are
widely used in different fields and represent area, length and
proportion judgment [8]. Icons are in the medical community
to communicate risks of diseases and importance of screening
[13]. They represent natural frequencies (i.e., 1 out of 10 ver-
sus 10%) and prior work has shown that they facilitate logical
reasoning [14] and accurately represent probabilities [27, 29].
Pie and donut charts are widely used in various fields such as
information graphics and market surveys. Although there are
many variants of the pie and donut charts [39, 24], we opted
for the standard designs. The triangle, circle, and bar are all
common in the medical community [1], and represent area
and length judgment [8].
Procedure
After selecting the task on Mechanical Turk, participants con-
sented per [redacted for anonymity] IRB protocol. They
read the instructions for the study and completed one trial
round using the text-only example shown on page . They
then saw a short tutorial that explained the selections and the
bonus calculation. Specifically, we explained that participants
should first enter their best guess for the visualized proba-
bilities. They only needed to select one of the options. The
system automatically completed the other. Similarly, for the
lottery choices, they only needed to select one of the options
where they switched either decision. The system automatically
populated the remaining radio buttons. To prevent potential
biasing, we used a donut chart for the instructions which
was not a visualization condition in the study. Each partici-
pant was randomly assigned a visualization condition drawn
from the set {icons, pie, circle, triangle, and bar} and com-
pleted 25 tasks where they entered their best guess for the
probability values displayed which were drawn from the set
P = {.05, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, .95}. The order of the sheets was
counterbalanced to prevent ordering effects.
Measures
The study resulted in 10,150 observations (406 participants
each completed 25 lottery sheets). During the experiment, we
recorded the participants’ probability estimates and preference
selections. The experiment included the following indepen-
dent variables:
• 7 Probability Values: {.05, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, .95}
• 5 Visualizations: {icons, pie,circle, triangle,bar}
Our dependent variables were:
• EXACT: Binary true or false if the participant’s probability
estimate matches the true probability.
Figure 5. The mean error at each probability value for each visualization
condition. We observe how probability values have an effect on proba-
bility distortion and how these variations vary across designs
• BIAS: The difference between the participant’s probability
estimate and the true probability value.
Bias = pˆ− p,
where pˆ is participant’s estimate of the probability value
and p is the true probability.
• ERROR: The absolute value of BIAS
Hypotheses
Our hypotheses were:
• H1a: Icons group will yield the lowest ERROR. Partici-
pants in the icon group will be best at estimating the true
probability values and will be least likely to make errors.
• H1b: We will replicate the findings from existing body of
work on graphical perception. Participants will be better at
estimated probabilities with pie than with circle, triangle,
and bar. The anchor points in pie (e.g.: 25%, 50%, and
75%) will ease judgment [37]. We also we hypothesize
that estimates with circle and triangle will be worse overall,
as area judgment is the most difficult graphical perception
task [8].
Results
We begin our analysis by investigating EXACT answers for the
five different types of charts. We found that participants esti-
mated the EXACT probability 40% of the time. Subjects in the
icons group produced EXACT estimates 72.9% of times, per-
forming better than all other conditions. Pie, bar, triangle and
circle yielded 59.8%, 39.4%, 13.7%, and 10.6% respectively.
Ranking by Error
We then analyzed ERROR which captures the discrepancy
between the participants’ estimates and the exact proportions.
We observed overall mean ERROR scores of 0.0463 (σ =
.12), 0.0586 (σ = .12), 0.1497 (σ = .14), 0.1050 (σ = .11),
and 0.0831 (σ = .13) for icons, pie, circle, triangle, and bar
respectively. We conducted a comprehensive set of analyses to
investigate how visualization and probability values impacted
participants’ ERROR. Figure 5 summarizes our findings.
A Kruskal-Wallis H non-parametric test revealed a statisti-
cally significant difference in the overall ERROR across con-
ditions, χ2(4,N = 8475) = 1,412.61, p < .001. Pairwise
Figure 6. The ranking of visualization conditions based on mean error
across probability values
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests with a Bonferroni-adjusted
alpha (α = 0.0023) uncovered that differences in accuracy
between all pairs of charts were statistically different with
adjusted p-values less than .001, suggesting a strict ordering
icons>pie>bar>triangle>circle.
The observed mean ERROR for across probabilities
.05, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, and .95 were 0.0558 (σ = .11), 0.0671
(σ = .12), 0.0848 (σ = .13), 0.0931(σ = .14) 0.0703(σ =
.09), 0.0558(σ = .11) and 0.0531(σ = .11) respectively (see
Figure 6). We also observe that ERROR is the highest at .5 for
conditions circle and triangle.
A series of Kruskal-Wallis H non-parametric test confirmed
that ERROR across the range of probability values were all
significantly different with p < .001. To provide a ranking
of the visualization conditions at each probability value, we
conducted Pairwise Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests with a
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha to test for significant differences in
ERROR among the charts at each probability value. Based on
the results, we provided a ranking shown in Figure 6.
Proportion Estimate Model Comparison
Our final analysis sought to examine how visualization design
impacts probability distortion across different probability val-
ues. We conducted a series of simple linear regressions 1 to
examine whether it is possible to predict BIAS given the true
probability values (p) for each chart. The linear model take
the form:
yv = βv0 +βv1x,
where y represents the outcome variable, and x is the true
probability. Table 2 summarizes the findings. The results of
the regressions indicate that the models explained 70% to 85%
of the variance and all models were significant with p < 001,
providing evidence that p predicted BIAS. Figure 7 shows
the linear models for each visualization conditions. The final
predictive models were:
• icons: 0.0520+0.9192p
1Although we report only a linear regression, our analysis also ex-
amined a log-linear and a linear log odd model using individual
observations. We determined, based on the AIC and deviance values,
that the linear model was the best fit for every chart.
Table 2. The rsquare, AIC, skewness, kurtosis and deviance values for
the ERROR linear model for each design. These values were compared
to a log linear and a linear log odds regression and showed a better fit.
condition rsquare AIC skewness kurtosis deviance
icon 0.86 -2326.88 0.79 10.02 24.39
pie 0.83 -2170.19 0.72 7.89 27.60
circle 0.70 -1002.68 -0.52 3.78 41.06
triangle 0.84 -2167.39 0.34 6.07 27.09
bar 0.78 -1298.03 0.54 5.54 28.73
• pie: 0.0766+0.8667p
• circle: 0.1878+0.7990p
• triangle: 0.1353+0.8828p
• bar: 0.0923+0.8514p
Discussion
At a high-level, the results from Experiment 1 provides three
important contributions. First our findings serve as a re-
examination and replication of prior work. Second, our anal-
ysis and experiment design provides meaningful extensions
that are important to translate research findings into practical
design guidelines. Third, we establish a baseline for subjective
proportion estimates, allowing us to better isolate the impact
that charts may have on decision-making.
Icons are best.
The results of our study reveal significant differences in risk
perception across visualization representations. The notion
that visual design biases risk perception is far from novel.
Differing from prior work, we tested proportion distortion
with icon arrays, and showed that participants in the icons
group were most likely to estimate the exact proportions and
made the smallest errors overall. Advocates of icon arrays
believe that countable objects (natural frequencies) are more
aligned with the way people think about proportions.
Our results partially support findings of Cleveland and
McGill [8, 9, 10]. We observed that people in the triangle and
circle groups were generally worst at estimating proportions,
corroborating that judgment with area proportioned charts
were challenging for people in these groups. Unlike Cleve-
land and McGill, we found that the pie design performed
Figure 7. The bias across probability values for each design. We observe
that BIAS is positive across most probability values showing an overesti-
mation in proportion estimate. For very high probabilities, proportion
estimate is most often underestimated
reasonably well at minimizing proportion distortions. This
is likely because the task was essentially a part-of-the-whole
judgment [37, 41, 39] and the 25%, 50% and 75% anchor
points provided useful visual cues.
Overestimating the small and underestimating the large.
An analysis of perception errors across the seven different
probability values led to further discoveries. Unsurprisingly,
people made significantly fewer errors with pie when the prob-
ability was 25%, 50% or 75%, with the lowest errors at 75%.
People made significantly more errors when the true probabil-
ity was 50% with the triangle and circle designs.
Across all charts, we observed an overall tendency for the
people to overestimate small percentages and underestimate
large probabilities. This phenomena of overestimating and
underestimating can be found in many other environments [44,
48]. For example, judging the frequency of letters in the
English text [2], estimating word frequency [4], estimating
the proportion of white vs. black circles during a perceptual
task [6, 44], and as we will show in Experiment 2, estimating
gambles [20]. It is possible that proportion estimates with vi-
sualization design and these high-level judgment are governed
by the same laws, and researchers have developed theories
and models to account for this probability/frequency distortion
effect [48]. However, future work is needed to investigate this
phenomenon.
There are possibly many external components that come into
play when observing probability distortion. It is likely in-
fluenced by factors such as the nature of the data, the en-
vironmental context or even individual characteristics. Fu-
ture work is need to investigate the nuances of these ef-
fects. Still, our findings suggest that that icon array was
the most effective visualization for representing percentages.
Among all the charts we explored observed an ordering of
icons>pie>bar>triangle>circle, based on people’s accuracy
in perceiving the true probabilities.
EXPERIMENT 2: LOTTERIES
Our second experiment aims to uncover the impact of visu-
alization design on decision-making. Consistent with Exper-
iment 1, we used the gambling game to elicit choices. The
lotteries in this experiment are structured similarly to the ones
in Experiment 1. However, in this experiment we do not
prompt participants to estimate the probabilities visualized as
it is possible that this step could bias the lottery decisions that
we observe.
Participants
We recruited 300 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
There were 193 men and and self-reported ages ranged from
19 to 65 years (µ = 34.0;σ = 9.01). 56% of our participants
self-reported to have completed at least a college education.
The qualifications and bonus payments produces remained the
same as Experiment 1.
Procedure
In a similar fashion to Experiment I, we presented partici-
pants with 25 two-outcome lotteries (n = 2) that were choices
between risky and certain gains. The probabilities, pi, were
Figure 8. The median RRP values across probability values for each vi-
sualization condition. For all visualization conditions people were more
risk seeking for low probabilities (RRP<0) and more risk averse for high
probabilities (RRP<0). At 50%, participants tended to be risk neutral
drawn from the set P = {.05, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, .95} and the
outcomes x1 and x2 ranged from 0 to 150 points. Table 1,
summarizes the probability and outcome combinations used
in the study.
Each participant was randomly assigned a visualization condi-
tion drawn from the set {icons, pie, circle, triangle, bar and
none} where none is the text-only condition. We make two
changes to lottery sheet design: (1) We removed the prompts
for probability estimates; and (2) For the control condition (no
visualization), participants saw the lottery prospects in text.
Measures
The experiment included the following independent variables:
• 7 Probability Values: {.05, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, .95}
• 6 Visualizations: {none, icons, pie,circle, triangle,bar}
To measure decision quality, our dependent variable was:
• RRP: The Relative Risk Premia is used to evaluate the
quality of the lottery decisions [7] and can be seen as a
measure of rationality.
RRP = (ev− ce)/|ev|,
where ev denotes the expected value of the lottery outcome
and ce is the certainty equivalent of the lottery. We can
calculate the utility of a given prospect using the equation
below:
ev =
n
∑
i=1
pixi
We calculate the lottery’s certainty equivalent as the average
of the smallest certain amount that the participant selected
on the sheet and the subsequent certain amount on the
sheet. For example, let us assume that figure 3 indicates a
participant’s selection. The certainty equivalent here is 525
( ce = (550+500)/2 ).
RRP > 0 indicates risk aversion, RRP < 0 implies risk seek-
ing behavior and RRP = 0 suggests risk neutrality. It is
important to note that the RRP is independent of the per-
ceived probability values.
Figure 9. The ordering of visualization conditions based on median RRP
across probability values.
Hypotheses
Following our experiment design, we formed the following
hypotheses:
Our hypotheses were:
• H2a: The decision that we observe will follow Prospect
Theory. In particular, we anticipate that participants will
be risk-seeking for small probabilities (RRP < 0) and risk-
averse for large probabilities (RRP > 0) gains [20].
• H2b: We expect to observe RRPicons > RRPnone. Previous
research has shown that people are more risk averse when
presented icon arrays compared to text [36]. Therefore, we
anticipate that participants in the icons group will be less
risk-taking compared to the none group.
• H2c: Based on the data from our Experiment 1, we hypoth-
esize that perceptual errors with visualization design will
influence behaviour. For example, we expect to observe that
RRPnone , RRPcircle and RRPnone , RRPtriangle.
Results
We conducted a fine-grained analysis of users’ decisions across
visualization conditions and probability values, using the Rel-
ative Risk Premia (RRP) to assess risk attitudes and decision-
making behavior.
We observed overall median RRP values of 0.0167, 0.0000,
0.0155, 0.0273, -0.6625, and -0.0500 for none icons, pie,
bar,triangle and circle respectively. Figure 8 shows the me-
dian RRP values across different probability values for each
visualization design. We can observe that for all designs, users
were risk seeking for low probabilities (RRP < 0) and risk
averse for high probabilities (RRP > 0 ).
A Kruskal-Wallis H non-parametric test revealed statistically
significant differences in RRP across conditions, χ2(4,N =
8475) = 3408.1, p = 2.2e−16. To provide an ordering of the
visualization conditions based on the observed corresponding
risk behavior at each probability value, we first ran seper-
ate Kruskal-Wallis H non-parametric test for each probalitity
value then pairwise Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests with a
Bonferroni-adjusted alphas. Based on the results, we provided
a ranking shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 10. The logarithmic regression model showing the behavior of
RRP across probability values for each visualization condition. This
model has a better goodness-of-fit compare to a linear model.
Model Comparison
Our analysis examined a linear and a logarithmic regression
using individual observations. We determined based on AIC
and deviance that the logarithmic model was the best fit for
every chart. The logarithmic model takes the form:
yv = βv0 +βv1 ln(x),
where y represents the outcome variable and x is the true
probability. Table 3 summarizes the findings. All models were
significant with p < 001, providing evidence that p predicted
RRP. Figure 8 shows the logarithmic regression capturing the
behavior of RRP across probability values. The final predictive
models were:
• icons: 0.5296+1.0313ln(p)
• pie: 0.5243+0.9653ln(p)
• circle: 0.4411+0.9029ln(p)
• triangle: 0.1353+0.8828ln(p)
• bar: 0.5281+0.8236ln(p)
Discussion
The overall patterns in decision-making are clear. Across all
conditions, participants were risk-seeking with low-probability
values and risk-averse with high probabilities. This repli-
cates prior findings in the economics domain [7] and confirms
Prospect Theory [20].
A closer look at the RRP values across the different visualiza-
tion conditions revealed a more nuanced view of visualization-
mediated decisions. Our findings provide suggestive evidence
that visualization design can indeed impact the decisions that
people make. From Experiment 1, we observed that the circle
and triangle designs were most likely of the conditions to
distort the true probability values. Similarly, the results of
Experiment 2 showed that the lottery decisions made by the
circle and triangle groups deviated significantly for the control
condition (no visualization).
Our results only partially confirms the findings of prior work
that indicated that icon arrays may lead to more risk-averse be-
havior [36]. We found that participants in the icons group were
markedly more risk averse than the none group when p = .05,
but we observed no significant difference overall. This is likely
Table 3. The rsquare, AIC, skewness, kurtosis and deviance values
for the RRP logarithmic regression model for each design. These val-
ues were compared to a simple linear regression and showed a better
goodness-of-fit based on AIC and deviance values.
condition rsquare AIC skewness kurtosis deviance
icon 0.20 6996.28 4.52 30.24 7396.81
pie 0.25 4869.07 -3.79 24.57 3799.68
circle 0.23 3960.95 -4.05 27.16 3074.05
triangle 0.20 5476.71 -4.35 29.59 5117.81
bar 0.20 4841.80 -5.03 39.10 3716.02
due to the contextual differences in the experiment designs
and measures of decision making. In prior studies participants
decided whether or not they would opt for screening based on
visual risk information about the disease [13]. Future work is
need to investigate the effect scenario on risk taking behavior.
Although RRP provides a convenient measure for us to sum-
marize and classify risk taking behavior, we hesitate to draw
conclusions about the quality of the decisions that we observed.
The desirability of the risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior is
context dependent. Still, risk neutrality is an objective measure
of rational decision-making, and using RRP allows us quantify
and model departures from risk neutrality.
It should be noted that the visualizations chosen for this study
are all commonly used in data visualization tasks across nu-
merous disciplines and applications. Gambling, as presented it
in this experiment, is a basic judgment task similar to the ones
that people typically perform in everyday situations. For ex-
ample, similar charts are often used to communicate medical
risks and to support patients’ decision making. Consequently,
discrepancies in probability perception and decision-making
across visualization designs and probability values are sub-
stantial findings that have a direct impact on the design and
evaluation of risk visualization.
CONCLUSION
We used a crowed-sourced real-life lottery game to assess the
effect of five visualization designs on probability distortion,
risk-perception and decision-making. Our findings showed
significant differences in perceptual errors across the visu-
alizations conditions, showing that visualization mediates
graphical perception which is the main cause of probabil-
ity distortion. Our results also demonstrate that across all
conditions, people tend to overestimate small probabilities
and underestimate large probability values. Using the per-
ceptual errors, we rank the representations based on subjects’
accuracy in decoding quantitative information for each visual-
ization condition across all probability values, and on average:
icons>pie>bar>triangle>circle.
An analysis of gambling decisions found some consistent be-
havioral patterns across all visualization conditions. We found
that participants were risk-seeking with low-probabilities and
risk averse with high probabilities. Furthermore, our results
show a significant effect of visualization on risk attitudes. For
instance, subjects in the circle and triangle groups exhibited
greater risk-seeking behavior than participants in the text-only
condition. Similar to the perception analysis, we rank the
visualization conditions based on how they mediate risk and
overall: none >= icons >= bar >= circle >= pie >= triangle.
We showed that this ranking changes across probability values,
where some conditions are more consistent while others vary
in risk-behavior across probability values. We believe that
these results can have practical impacts on the design and eval-
uation of data visualizations to assist decision-making process
with risk.
REFERENCES
[1] Visualizing Health. http://www.vizhealth.org/gallery.
(????). Accessed: 2019-09-19.
[2] Fred Attneave. 1953. Psychological probability as a
function of experienced frequency. Journal of
Experimental Psychology 46, 2 (1953), 81.
[3] Scott Bateman, Regan L Mandryk, Carl Gutwin, Aaron
Genest, David McDine, and Christopher Brooks. 2010.
Useful junk?: the effects of visual embellishment on
comprehension and memorability of charts. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 2573–2582.
[4] Ian Begg. 1974. Estimation of word frequency in
continuous and discrete tasks. Journal of Experimental
Psychology 102, 6 (1974), 1046.
[5] Michelle A Borkin, Zoya Bylinskii, Nam Wook Kim,
Constance May Bainbridge, Chelsea S Yeh, Daniel
Borkin, Hanspeter Pfister, and Aude Oliva. 2016.
Beyond memorability: Visualization recognition and
recall. IEEE transactions on visualization and computer
graphics 22, 1 (2016), 519–528.
[6] JB Brooke and AW MacRae. 1977. Error patterns in the
judgment and production of numerical proportions.
Perception & psychophysics 21, 4 (1977), 336–340.
[7] Adrian Bruhin, Helga Fehr-Duda, and Thomas Epper.
2010. Risk and rationality: Uncovering heterogeneity in
probability distortion. Econometrica 78, 4 (2010),
1375–1412.
[8] William S Cleveland and Robert McGill. 1984.
Graphical perception: Theory, experimentation, and
application to the development of graphical methods.
Journal of the American statistical association 79, 387
(1984), 531–554.
[9] William S Cleveland and Robert McGill. 1986. An
experiment in graphical perception. International
Journal of Man-Machine Studies 25, 5 (1986), 491–500.
[10] William S Cleveland and Robert McGill. 1987.
Graphical perception: The visual decoding of
quantitative information on graphical displays of data.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A
(General) 150, 3 (1987), 192–210.
[11] Michael Correll and Michael Gleicher. 2014. Error bars
considered harmful: Exploring alternate encodings for
mean and error. IEEE transactions on visualization and
computer graphics 20, 12 (2014), 2142–2151.
[12] Milton Friedman and Leonard J Savage. 1948. The
utility analysis of choices involving risk. Journal of
political Economy 56, 4 (1948), 279–304.
[13] Mirta Galesic and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. 2009. Using
Icon Arrays to Communicate Medical Risks:
Overcoming Low Numeracy. Health Psychology (2009).
[14] Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage. 1995. How to
improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction:
frequency formats. Psychological review 102, 4 (1995),
684.
[15] Lane Harrison, Fumeng Yang, Steven Franconeri, and
Remco Chang. 2014. Ranking visualizations of
correlation using weber’s law. IEEE transactions on
visualization and computer graphics 20, 12 (2014),
1943–1952.
[16] Jeffrey Heer and Michael Bostock. 2010.
Crowdsourcing graphical perception: using mechanical
turk to assess visualization design. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing
systems. ACM, 203–212.
[17] Jessica Hullman, Xiaoli Qiao, Michael Correll, Alex
Kale, and Matthew Kay. 2019. In Pursuit of Error: A
Survey of Uncertainty Visualization Evaluation. IEEE
transactions on visualization and computer graphics 25,
1 (2019), 903–913.
[18] Jessica Hullman, Paul Resnick, and Eytan Adar. 2015.
Hypothetical outcome plots outperform error bars and
violin plots for inferences about reliability of variable
ordering. PloS one 10, 11 (2015), e0142444.
[19] Waqas Javed, Bryan McDonnel, and Niklas Elmqvist.
2010. Graphical perception of multiple time series.
IEEE transactions on visualization and computer
graphics 16, 6 (2010), 927–934.
[20] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. 2013. Prospect
theory: An analysis of decision under risk. In Handbook
of the fundamentals of financial decision making: Part I.
World Scientific, 99–127.
[21] Alex Kale, Francis Nguyen, Matthew Kay, and Jessica
Hullman. 2019. Hypothetical Outcome Plots Help
Untrained Observers Judge Trends in Ambiguous Data.
IEEE transactions on visualization and computer
graphics 25, 1 (2019), 892–902.
[22] Matthew Kay, Tara Kola, Jessica R Hullman, and
Sean A Munson. 2016. When (ish) is my bus?:
User-centered visualizations of uncertainty in everyday,
mobile predictive systems. In Proceedings of the 2016
CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems. ACM, 5092–5103.
[23] Ralph L Keeney and Howard Raiffa. 1993. Decisions
with multiple objectives: preferences and value
trade-offs. Cambridge university press.
[24] Robert Kosara. 2019. The Impact of Distribution and
Chart Type on Part-to-Whole Comparisons. EG/VGTC
Conference on Visualization (2019).
[25] Stephan Lewandowsky and Ian Spence. 1989.
Discriminating strata in scatterplots. J. Amer. Statist.
Assoc. 84, 407 (1989), 682–688.
[26] Jock Mackinlay, Pat Hanrahan, and Chris Stolte. 2007.
Show me: Automatic presentation for visual analysis.
IEEE transactions on visualization and computer
graphics 13, 6 (2007), 1137–1144.
[27] Luana Micallef, Pierre Dragicevic, and Jean-Daniel
Fekete. 2012. Assessing the effect of visualizations on
bayesian reasoning through crowdsourcing. IEEE
Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics
18, 12 (2012), 2536–2545.
[28] Limor Nadav-Greenberg, Susan L. Joslyn, and Meng U.
Taing. 2008. The Effect of Weather Forecast Uncertainty
Visualization on Decision Making. Journal of Cognitive
Science (2008).
[29] Alvitta Ottley, Evan M Peck, Lane T Harrison, Daniel
Afergan, Caroline Ziemkiewicz, Holly A Taylor, Paul KJ
Han, and Remco Chang. 2015. Improving Bayesian
reasoning: The effects of phrasing, visualization, and
spatial ability. IEEE transactions on visualization and
computer graphics 22, 1 (2015), 529–538.
[30] Alvitta Ottley, Evan M Peck, Lane T Harrison, Daniel
Afergan, Caroline Ziemkiewicz, Holly A Taylor, Paul KJ
Han, and Remco Chang. 2016. Improving Bayesian
reasoning: The effects of phrasing, visualization, and
spatial ability. IEEE transactions on visualization and
computer graphics 22, 1 (2016), 529–538.
[31] Anshul Vikram Pandey, Katharina Rall, Margaret L
Satterthwaite, Oded Nov, and Enrico Bertini. 2015. How
deceptive are deceptive visualizations?: An empirical
analysis of common distortion techniques. In
Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM,
1469–1478.
[32] Evan M M Peck, Beste F Yuksel, Alvitta Ottley,
Robert JK Jacob, and Remco Chang. 2013. Using fNIRS
brain sensing to evaluate information visualization
interfaces. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 473–482.
[33] Kristin Potter, Paul Rosen, and Chris R Johnson. 2011.
From quantification to visualization: A taxonomy of
uncertainty visualization approaches. In IFIP Working
Conference on Uncertainty Quantification. Springer,
226–249.
[34] Drazen Prelec and George Loewenstein. 1991. Decision
Making Over Time and Under Uncertainty: A Common
Approach. Management Science (1991).
[35] Ronald A Rensink and Gideon Baldridge. 2010. The
perception of correlation in scatterplots. In Computer
Graphics Forum, Vol. 29. Wiley Online Library,
1203–1210.
[36] Jorge G. Ruiz, Allen D. Andrade, Rocio
Garcia-Retamero, and Remanakumar Anam. 2013.
Communicating global cardiovascular risk: Are icon
arrays better than numerical estimates in improving
understanding, recall and perception of risk? Patient
Education and Counseling (2013).
[37] David Simkin and Reid Hastie. 1987. An
information-processing analysis of graph perception. J.
Amer. Statist. Assoc. 82, 398 (1987), 454–465.
[38] Drew Skau, Lane Harrison, and Robert Kosara. 2015.
An evaluation of the impact of visual embellishments in
bar charts. In Computer Graphics Forum, Vol. 34. Wiley
Online Library, 221–230.
[39] Drew Skau and Robert Kosara. 2016a. Arcs, angles, or
areas: Individual data encodings in pie and donut charts.
In Computer Graphics Forum, Vol. 35. Wiley Online
Library, 121–130.
[40] Drew Skau and Robert Kosara. 2016b. Judgment error in
pie chart variations. In Proceedings of the
Eurographics/IEEE VGTC conference on visualization:
Short papers. 91–95.
[41] Ian Spence and Stephan Lewandowsky. 1991.
Displaying proportions and percentages. Applied
Cognitive Psychology 5, 1 (1991), 61–77.
[42] Lothar Tremmel. 1995. The visual separability of
plotting symbols in scatterplots. Journal of
Computational and Graphical Statistics 4, 2 (1995),
101–112.
[43] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. Advances
in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of
Uncertainty. Risk Uncertain 5 (1992), 297–323.
[44] Carol A Varey, Barbara A Mellers, and Michael H
Birnbaum. 1990. Judgments of proportions. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance 16, 3 (1990), 613.
[45] Daniel Wigdor, Chia Shen, Clifton Forlines, and Ravin
Balakrishnan. 2007. Perception of elementary graphical
elements in tabletop and multi-surface environments. In
CHI, Vol. 8. 473–482.
[46] Fumeng Yang, Lane T Harrison, Ronald A Rensink,
Steven L Franconeri, and Remco Chang. 2019.
Correlation judgment and visualization features: A
comparative study. IEEE transactions on visualization
and computer graphics 25, 3 (2019), 1474–1488.
[47] Jeff Zacks, Ellen Levy, Barbara Tversky, and Diane J
Schiano. 1998. Reading bar graphs: Effects of
extraneous depth cues and graphical context. Journal of
experimental psychology: Applied 4, 2 (1998), 119.
[48] Hang Zhang and Laurence T. Maloney. 2012.
Ubiquitous Log Odds: A Common Representation of
Probability and Frequency Distortion in Perception,
Action, and Cognition. Frontiers in Neuroscience (2012),
1–10.
